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Imagine this scenario: A long-time Idaho public school teacher
has been accused by the school district administration of embezzling
funds or stealing property belonging to the school district; or, the
school district administration believes that the same teacher has been
performing her job in an unsatisfactory manner. Pursuant to Idaho
statutory law, the superintendent makes a recommendation to the
school board that it discharge the teacher in the first instance, or not
renew the teacher's contract in the second instance. The school board
then notices the matter for hearing. The administration, through its
* General Counsel, Idaho Education Association; Adjunct Instructor, Department of Educational Administration, College of Graduate Studies and College of Education, University of Idaho-Boise Campus.
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superintendent, presents its case against the teacher to the school
board, and the teacher presents evidence attempting to rebut the accusations or allegations. The school board, after hearing the matter,
issues a decision finding just and reasonable cause to accept the administration's recommendation of discharge or nonrenewal and terminates the teacher's employment.
The teacher believes that, because there is only slight evidence to
support the administration's accusations, the administration failed to
prove that she engaged in such misconduct or did not perform her job
duties satisfactorily. The teacher also believes that, even if the evidence was sufficient to prove the conduct alleged, the school board's
issuance of the ultimate employment sanction-termination-was not
justified by the conduct. Not surprisingly, the school board and administration believe that the conduct was sufficient to support the
nonrenewal or discharge decision, and that the "punishment" did fit
the "crime." The teacher must now decide, in consultation with her attorney, whether she has meritorious grounds to challenge the school
board's just and reasonable cause determination by filing a wrongful
termination action. If the teacher files suit, the school district and its
attorney must then analyze whether the school board's termination
decision is defensible. In particular, an assessment of the merits of the
action, by counsel for both sides, will turn on the standard of review
that the court will apply to the school board's just and reasonable
cause determination.
This article will argue that, based on Idaho law, and, more fundamentally, based on well-settled principles of procedural due process,
judicial review of a school board's just and reasonable cause determination must be under a de novo, i.e. independent and non-deferential,
standard of review. Part I of this article will discuss Idaho's administrative system and system of judicial review for teacher discharge and
nonrenewal cases based on a just and reasonable cause determination
by the school board. Part II will discuss existing Idaho case law on the
standard of review or degree of deference issue, which clearly requires
de novo judicial review of school board just and reasonable cause determinations. Part III will discuss procedural due process principles
applicable to a school board decision terminating an employee who
has a property interest in his or her employment and compensation.
These principles require that the administrative and judicial review
procedures in these cases, when viewed as a whole, must provide a
level playing field upon which the teacher's right to continued employment is determined. Part IV will address relationship and procedural issues that impact the standard of review and procedural due
process questions. It will first discuss the relationship between the
superintendent and the school board. It will also discuss the teacher's
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lack of ability to compel the attendance of witnesses to defend against
allegations at the discharge or nonrenewal hearing before the board.
Part V will evaluate those relational and structural realities against
due process principles and conclude that de novo review, rather than
some lesser, more deferential standard, must apply to judicial review
of school board just and reasonable cause determinations. Finally,
Part VI will identify and discuss the types of administrative hearing
and judicial review systems that must be in place to satisfy due process requirements.
I. IDAHO'S ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW SYSTEM
IN TEACHER DISCHARGE AND NONRENEWAL CASES
In Idaho, teachers in their first three years of teaching with the
same school district are considered annual contract teachers. Teachers who have signed four or more consecutive employment contracts
with the same school district are considered renewable or continuing
contract teachers.' Idaho statutory law affords due process protection
to annual contract teachers discharged in the middle of their contract
term. Due process is also afforded to renewable contract teachers discharged either in the middle of their contract term or whose contracts
are not renewed at the end of their contract term. As to renewable
contract teachers, section 33-515 of the Idaho Code provides in pertinent part as follows:
If the board of trustees takes action to immediately discharge
or discharge upon termination of the current contract a certificated person whose contract would otherwise be automatically renewed, or to renew the contract of any such person at a
reduced salary, the action of the board shall be consistent with
the procedures specified in section 33-513(5), Idaho Code, and
furthermore, the board shall notify the employee in writing
1. Brown v. Caldwell Sch. Dist. No. 132, 127 Idaho 112, 115, 898 P.2d 43, 46
(1995) (citing IDAHO CODE §§ 33-514, 33-515). At the time of the Idaho Supreme Court's
decision in Brown, section 33-514 recognized only one type of contract under which
school districts could hire annual contract teachers. During the 2000 legislative session, the legislature substantially amended section 33-514 to provide, among other
things, three categories of contracts for annual contract teachers. See IDAHO CODE
§ 33-514(3)(a)-(c) (Michie 2001). Although the procedural rights of annual contract
teachers vary depending upon the category under which they are hired, those teachers
are still properly referred to as annual contract teachers after the 2000 amendments.
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whether there is just and reasonable cause not to renew the
contract or to reduce the salary of the affected employee, and
2
if so, what reasons it relied upon in that determination.
In turn, section 33-513 sets forth an elaborate notice and hearing
regime, providing as follows:
The board of trustees of each school district including any specially chartered district, shall have the following powers and
duties:

5. To suspend, grant leave of absence, place on probation or
discharge certificated professional personnel for a material
violation of any lawful rules or regulations of the board of
trustees or of the state board of education, or for any conduct
which could constitute grounds for revocation of a teaching
certificate. Any certificated professional employee, except the
superintendent, may be discharged during a contract term
under the following procedures:
(a) The superintendent or any other duly authorized administrative officer of the school district may recommend the discharge of any certificated employee by filing with the board of
trustees written notice specifying the alleged reasons for discharge.
(b) Upon receipt of such notice the board acting through their
duly authorized administrative official, shall give the affected
employee written notice of the allegations and the recommendation of discharge, along with written notice of a hearing before the board prior to any determination by the board of the
truth of the allegations.
(c) The hearing shall be scheduled to take place not less than
six (6) days nor more than twenty-one (21) days after receipt
of the notice by the employee. The date provided for the hearing may be changed by mutual consent.
(d) The hearing shall be public unless the employee requests
in writing that it be in executive session.

2.

IDAHO CODE § 33-515 (Michie 2001).
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(e) All testimony at the hearing shall be given under oath or
affirmation. Any member of the board, or the clerk of the
board, may administer oaths to witnesses or affirmations by
witnesses.
(f) The employee may be represented by legal counsel and/or
by a representative of a local or state teachers association.
(g) The chairman of the board or the designee of the chairman
shall conduct the hearing.
(h) The board shall cause an electronic record of the hearing to
be made or shall employ a competent reporter to take stenographic or stenotype notes of all the testimony at the hearing.
A transcript of the hearing shall be provided at cost by the
board upon request of the employee.
(i) At the hearing the superintendent or other duly authorized
administrative officer shall present evidence to substantiate
the allegations contained in such notice.
(j) The employee may produce evidence to refute the allegations. Any witness presented by the superintendent or by the
employee shall be subject to cross-examination. The board
may also examine witnesses and be represented by counsel.
(k) The affected employee may file written briefs and arguments with the board within three (3) days after the close of
the hearing or such other time as may be agreed upon by the
affected employee and the board.
(1)Within fifteen (15) days following the close of the hearing,
the board shall determine and, acting through their duly authorized administrative official, shall notify the employee in
writing whether the evidence presented at the hearing established the truth of the allegations and whether the employee
is to be retained, immediately discharged, or discharged upon
termination of the current contract. 3
3.

IDAHO CODE § 33-513 (Michie 2004).
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The "hearing... referred to in the statute denotes the right to
confront witnesses, cross examine them, and present evidence on the
teacher's behalf."4 As such, the Idaho Supreme Court has referred to
sections 33-515 and 33-513(5) as "statutory due process requirements."5 Notably, although the statutes assume the superintendent or
an authorized designee will present the school district administration's case against the teacher to the school board, the statutes do not
authorize the teacher or administration to subpoena witnesses or
documents.
As expressly set forth in section 33-515, a school board must have
just and reasonable cause to discharge or not renew the employment
contract of a renewable contract employee. 6 Likewise, by operation of
law, an annual contract employee, like any other employee who an
employer seeks to discharge in the middle of a contract term, is entitled to just cause or good cause protection.7 Because the Idaho Legislature has not delineated a statutory scheme for judicial appellate review of a local school board's decision, a decision to dismiss a teacher
is reviewable by two methods: "a mandamus application or a civil action for breach of the teacher's contractual, statutory or constitutional
rights.""
Given the lack of statutory guidance, Idaho courts have had to
grapple with the question of what degree of judicial deference, if any,
a court must give to a school board's just cause determination in a
teacher nonrenewal or discharge case. As discussed below, the Idaho
Supreme Court, as well as two Idaho federal district court judges, has
definitively concluded that a district court's review of a school board's
4. Ferguson v. Bd. of Trs. of Bonner County Sch. Dist. No. 82, 98 Idaho 359,
363, 564 P.2d 971, 975 (1977) (interpreting statutory and regulatory predecessor to section 33-513(5)).
5. Lowder v. Minidoka County Joint Sch. Dist. No. 331, 132 Idaho 834, 839,
979 P.2d 1192, 1197 (1999).
6. IDAHO CODE § 33-515 (Michie 2001). Neither the Idaho Legislature nor the
Idaho Supreme Court has defined just and reasonable cause. Just cause has been defined as "cause... which must be based on reasonable grounds, and there must be a
fair and honest reason, regulated by good faith." BLACK's LAW DICTiONARY 863 (6th ed.
1990). Likewise, the Idaho Supreme Court has defined the analogous term "good
cause" as "[slubstantial reason, one that affords a legal excuse. Legally sufficient
ground or reason." Allen v. Lewis-Clark State Coll., 105 Idaho 447, 455, 670 P.2d 854,
862 (1983) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 623 (5th ed. 1979)).
7. See Rosecrans v. Intermountain Soap & Chem. Co., Inc., 100 Idaho 785,
787, 605 P.2d 963, 965 (1980); see also MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.8 at
696 (2d ed. 1999).
8. Kolp v. Bd. of Trs. of Butte County Joint Sch. Dist. No. 111, 102 Idaho
320, 322, 629 P.2d 1153, 1155 (1981); see also Bowler v. Bd. of Trs. of Sch. Dist. No.
392, 101 Idaho 537, 540, 617 P.2d 841, 844 (1980).
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just cause or just and reasonable cause determination in a teacher
discharge or nonrenewal must be de novo. Stated another way, the
just cause issue must be tried completely anew and a school board's
just cause determination is entitled to no deference whatsoever when
the issue is tried in the district court.9
II. IDAHO CASE LAW ON THE STANDARD OF REVIEW/DEGREE
OF DEFERENCE ISSUE
The Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that when a teacher is
discharged by a school board under the just and reasonable cause
standard set forth in Idaho Code section 33-515 and incorporated into
the teacher's employment contract, he or she is entitled to a trial de
novo in district court, where the board's decision is not binding.10 In
Kolp, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed, in part, the trial court's decision upholding a school board's decision discharging a renewable
contract teacher under the just and reasonable cause provision set
forth in section 33-515's statutory predecessor. Remanding the matter
for trial under the teacher's statutory and breach of contract theories,
the court held as follows:
In the interests of justice, we remand that portion of the case
dealing with the substantive issues to the district court with
directions to grant a trial de novo. Cf Cooper v. Board of
County Commissioners, supra (Bakes, J., concurring opinion
upon rehearing).
That trial would present a proper forum for examination of
the causes for the discharge. The teacher would have the bur-

9. The term "de novo" means "the court should make an independent determination of the issues." United States v. First City Nat'l Bank of Houston, 386 U.S.
361, 368 (1967). Similarly, "de novo trial" has been defined as "[tirying a matter anew;
the same as if it had not been heard before and as if no decision had previously been
rendered." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 435 (6th ed. 1990). For an excellent discussion of
the various standards of judicial review used by courts in reviewing employer just
cause determinations for discharge of employees, albeit a discussion that primarily addresses private sector cases and does not address the due process issues discussed below, see Jennifer M. Brun, Comment, Determining the Appropriate Level of Judicial
Deference to Public School Board Determinations of Cause in Wrongful Termination
Cases, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 781, 790-803 (2002).
10. Kolp, 102 Idaho at 327, 629 P.2d at 1160.
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den of proof. The board's decision would not be binding on the
court.

Any substantive argument... [concerning issues on remand] would, of course, be an issue for consideration in the de
novo proceeding.11
Justice Bistline, concurring and dissenting in Kolp, agreed that a
teacher discharged under the just and reasonable cause standard
would be entitled to a trial de novo on her statutory and breach of contract claims in district court. He further clarified that the board's de-

ll. Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); see also Robinson v. Joint Sch.
Dist. No. 150, 100 Idaho 263, 596 P.2d 436 (1979). It might be argued that the supreme
court's references to a "trial de novo" and "de novo proceeding" pertained to a new trial
in the district court and not necessarily to the standard of judicial review concerning
the school board's just cause determination. This argument might be made because the
supreme court was remanding the substantive issues for a second trial in the district
court. A review, however, of Justice Bakes's concurring opinion in Cooper v. Bd. of
County Comm'rs of Ada County, 101 Idaho 407, 614 P.2d 947 (1980)-the opinion upon
which the Kolp majority relied in remanding the matter to the district court-makes
clear that the supreme court's reference to a trial de novo does, in fact, pertain to the
level of deference that the district court should pay to the school board's decision to
discharge the teacher.
Justice Bakes, in his concurrence in Cooper, first noted that the district
judge's conclusion that "on an appeal from the decision of the board of commissioners
of Ada County he was 'in effect bound to rehear the validity of zoning disputes de novo'.
•. or anew, was correct." 101 Idaho at 414, 614 P.2d at 954. Justice Bakes went on to
state that
[wihen the matter was appealed and heard anew by the district court all of
the proceedings that had occurred before the zoning commission or the Board
prior to that time were of no significance .... [It was as if the slate were
wiped clean, and the case proceeds in the district court "as though originally
brought in said court .... "
Id.
As Justice Bakes saw it, "the only question before this Court is whether the
district court properly tried the case de novo, or anew, rather than merely determining
whether the Board of County Commissioners had 'abused their discretion.'" Id. Concluding that the district court failed to make "its own judgment of the facts and the
law, unfettered by the opinion of the zoning beard and the Board of County Commissioners below," Justice Bakes felt that the matter should have been "reverse[d] and
remand[ed] to the district court for a true de novo decision. . . ." 101 Idaho at 415, 614
P.2d at 955.
Thus, any doubt that the Kolp majority's reference to a "trial de novo" pertained to the standard of review governing the district court's review of the school
board's just cause determination is eliminated by a close reading of the authority upon
which it relied, i.e., Justice Bakes's concurring opinion upon rehearing in Cooper.
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cision would be entitled to no deference whatsoever in that proceeding, stating as follows:
This leads to my final area of concern-the weight to be given
the decision of the Board. In a mandamus proceeding, or in an
A.P.A. review, the decision of the Board would be given considerable weight, i.e., the question would be whether the
Board had abused its discretion. In a contract action, however,
under the standard enunciated by this Court, the decision of
the Board is entitled to absolutely no presumptive weight.
[FN9]
FN9. For example, the district court noted in its
opinion that the Board could have believed the students' version of how many times they were hit, rather
than the teachers [sic]. But in a contract action, the
trier-of-fact will determine whom to believe, and if the
fact finder chooses to believe the teacher, then the
question will be whether there was just cause to fire
him for hitting the children six times. There will be no
deference given to the Board's decision to believe the
students and consider whether there was just cause
given that he hit the students sixteen times.
The Board is simply one of the parties to the contract.
Whether the Board breached its contract will be determined
by the finder-of-fact as an initial matter, without any deference to the discretion of the Board. While I believe this result
is correct under current law, it raises substantial policy issues
that the legislature may wish to consider.
The legislature in I.C. § 33-513 carefully provided procedural
due process to teachers threatened with dismissal. The legislature did not, however, explicitly provide a means of judicial
review of the Board's decision. By holding that the proper
method to test the substantive decision is through a breach of
contract action, this Court is placing the power over hiring
and firing teachers in the courts rather than in the school
boards. A court and a school board may have different views
on what constitutes just cause, and, in spite of the elaborate
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procedural safeguards imposed upon the Board, the Board's
decision is totally meaningless when the issue goes before the
court. It is for the legislature, not the Court to decide where
12
dismissal decisions should be made.
Similarly, United States District Judge Lynn Winmill, relying on
Kolp and Robinson, refused to certify the question of the standard of
judicial review of a school board decision finding just cause to terminate a tenured teacher to the Idaho Supreme Court, stating that
"the... [Idaho high] [ciourt has spoken with sufficient clarity as to
the standard of review..
-13 In so holding, Judge Winmill believed
that a jury, rather than the school board, must be the final, independent arbiter of whether the school board had just and reasonable cause
to discharge a teacher. According to Judge Winmill
The remaining state claim is essentially a breach of contract
claim. In presenting this matter before a jury, the appropriate
standardis the same as it would be in any other breach of contract claim. Upon presentation of the facts, the jury would be
called upon to determine whether or not the school board's action amounted to a breach of the employment contract between plaintiff and defendant. In other words, the jury must
decide whether the school board had just cause for terminating the employment of [the teacher] 14
And, United States District Judge Edward Lodge, again relying
on Kolp, has likewise held that the de novo standard applies to review
of a school board's decision discharging a renewable contract teacher. 15
In sum, both the Idaho Supreme Court and two federal judges
have determined that a school board's just cause determination in a
12. Kolp, 102 Idaho at 333, 629 P.2d at 1166 (Bistline, J., concurring and dissenting). Brun fails to recognize that the court majority opinion in Kolp calls for de
novo review of the just cause issue and mischaracterizes Justice Bistline's concurring
and dissenting opinion as "stat[ing] that substantive decisions should be left to the
school board." Brun, supra note 9, at 788 n. 37.
13. Browning v. Jefferson Joint Sch. Dist. No. 251, Civ. No. 99-194-E-BLW (D.
Idaho Apr. 11, 2001) (order denying certification).
14. Id. (emphasis added).
15. Belcourt v. Wallace Sch. Dist. No. 393, Civ. No. 02-227-N-EJL, (D. Idaho
Feb. 7, 2005) (order resolving state law question). Judge Lodge initially certified the standard of review question on a school board's just cause determination in a teacher discharge case to the Idaho Supreme Court. Belcourt v. Wallace Sch. Dist. No. 393, (D. Idaho
Jan. 29, 2004) (order certifying questions of state law to the Idaho Supreme Court). The
Idaho Supreme Court, however, declined to accept certification of the question. In re Order Certifying Questions of State Law to the Idaho Supreme Court, Belcourt v. Wallace
Sch. Dist. No. 393, No. 99505, Ref. No. 04S-42 (Idaho Mar. 12, 2004) (order declining request to certify questions of state law). As a result, Judge Lodge was forced to resolve the
question without additional guidance from the state high court.
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teacher discharge or nonrenewal case is subject to de novo judicial review. The question then becomes whether a more deferential standard
of review would be constitutionally acceptable given Idaho's procedural system and structure for making just cause determinations at
the school district level. As discussed below, and given the requirements of procedural due process, the question must be resolved in the
negative.
III. DUE PROCESS PRINCIPLES
Both the United States and Idaho Supreme Courts have held
that, where a public school teacher has a legitimate expectation of
continued employment, such that a school district can only sever employment for just cause or just and reasonable cause, the teacher has
a property interest in employment protected by due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 16 Procedural due process protections apply to adjudicative administrative
proceedings, as well as to courts. 17 In both settings, procedural due
process requires a "fair trial in a fair tribunal" and, specifically, a decision maker who is free from actual or probable bias.18 As some courts
have stated, a due process property holder is entitled to a "relatively
level playing field" upon which to defend against deprivation of their
constitutional property interest. 19
In articulating the due process principles that govern adjudicative proceedings concerning educators and other professionals, the
United States and Idaho Supreme Courts have accorded a presumption of honesty and integrity to administrative adjudicators. 20 The
United States Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that
"[c]ircumstances and relationships must be considered."2' Both high
16. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1985); Bd. of
Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972); Lowder v. Minidoka
County Joint Sch. Dist. No. 331, 132 Idaho 834, 839, 979 P.2d 1192, 1197 (1999).
17. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46-47 (1975); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411
U.S. 564, 579 (1973); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
18. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 46-47 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136
(1955)).
19. See, e.g., Nightlife Partners v. City of Beverly Hills, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 234,
242 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Withrow, 421 U.S. at 46).
20. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47; Ferguson v. Bd. of Trs. of Bonner County Sch.
Dist. No. 82, 98 Idaho 359, 366, 564 P.2d 971, 978 (1977).
21. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136.
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courts, discussing the issue in the same context, have recognized that
human frailties, either by themselves or stemming from certain structures or relationships, may cause a board to undermine an individual's due process rights. According to the United States Supreme
Court
[T]he [due process] inquiry was not whether the Board members were "actually biased but whether, in the natural course
of events, there is an indication of a possible temptation to an
average [person] sitting as a judge to try the case with bias for
or against any issue presented to [the person]."22
Or, as the United States Supreme Court stated in Withrow, in rejecting a contention that the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of bias in
administrative adjudication:
[Such contention] must convince that, under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness, conferring [such] powers on the same individuals poses such a
risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be
forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately
implemented.

...Of course, we should be alert to the possibilities of
bias that may lurk in the way particular procedures actually
23
work in practice.
Thus, as the United States Supreme Court stated long ago in discussing the requirements of administrative due process, "the 'hearing'
is designed to afford the safeguard that the one who decides shall be
bound in good conscience to consider the evidence, to be guided by
that alone, and to reach his conclusion uninfluenced by extraneous
considerations .... "24
22. Gibson, 411 U.S. at 571 (quoting Berryhill v. Gibson, 331 F. Supp. 122,
125 (M.D. Ala. 1971)). Accord Johnson v. Bonner County Sch. Dist. No. 82, 126 Idaho
490, 494, 887 P.2d 35, 39 (1994). The United States Supreme Court has indicated that,
in addition to or as a form of actual or probable bias, where an administrative adjudicator may have prejudged the case, has a pecuniary interest in the case's outcome, or
has been the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before him or it, "the
probability of actual bias on the part of the... decision maker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable." Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47 & nn.14-15; see also Stivers v. Pierce, 71
F.3d 732, 741 (9th Cir. 1995).
23. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47, 54.
24. Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 480 (1936), quoted in Breitling v.
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In addition, both high courts have made clear that "due process is
flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands." 25 Those same courts, as well as others, have held
that more elaborate procedures at one stage of the administrative and
26
judicial process may compensate for deficiencies at other stages.
Specifically, although certain administrative procedures and safeguards must be provided without fail, the existence of meaningful
post-termination administrative judicial review will make up for deficiencies in the prior administrative process. 27 Ultimately, in determining what process is constitutionally required at a given stage of the
proceeding, a court must consider the interests of the constitutional
property holder (here the teacher) and the government (here the
school district). It must also consider the value of and need for additional safeguards (here de novo judicial review) concerning the school
28
board's deprivation of its employee's constitutional property.
Before applying that balancing test, this article will identify and
analyze the relational and procedural issues underlying the teacher
discharge or nonrenewal hearing process.
Solenberger, 585 F. Supp. 289, 290 (W.D. Va. 1984), affd mem., 749 F.2d 30 (4th Cir.
1984).
25. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Bowler v. Bd. of Trs. of
Sch. Dist. No. 392, 101 Idaho 537, 542, 617 P.2d 841, 846 (1980).
26. Bignall v. N. Idaho Coll., 538 F.2d 243, 246 (9th Cir. 1976) (citing
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).
27. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545, 547-48 (1985),
cited in Brock v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 261-62 (1987); Prato v. Vallas, 771
N.E.2d 1053, 1065 (111. App. Ct. 2002); Allen v. Lewis-Clark State Coll., 105 Idaho 447,
464, 670 P.2d 854, 871 (1983); but cf Concrete Pipe and Products of Cal., Inc. v.
Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 618 (1993) ("Even appeal and a trial de
novo will not cure a failure to provide a neutral and detached adjudicator."). In Allen,
the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the discharge of a chief of campus security under a
'good cause" standard on the grounds that the State Board of Education had not acted
arbitrarily, capriciously, or in abuse of its discretion under Idaho's Administrative Procedures Act (IDAPA). 105 Idaho at 457-58, 670 P.2d at 864-65. In Smith v. Meridian
Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, the Idaho Supreme Court distinguished Allen and refused to apply the deferential IDAPA standard of review to a school district nonrenewal decision
on the grounds that school districts and school boards are not agencies under IDAPA.
128 Idaho 714, 721-22, 918 P.2d 583, 590-91 (1996). Although Allen's discussion of the
importance of meaningful post-termination review is important to the due process issue, its application of the IDAPA's "arbitrary, capricious/abuse of discretion" judicial
review standard does not change Kolp's holding that the de novo standard of review
applies to employee discharge decisions by school boards, who are not governed by
IDAPA.
28. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; Bowler, 101 Idaho at 542, 617 P.2d at 846.
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IV. RELATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL ISSUES RELEVANT TO
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
A. Relationship Between the School Board and Superintendent
In Idaho, as in other jurisdictions, a locally-elected board of trustees governs a school district.29 As one aspect of a school board's governance, a school board is charged with the power and duty to, where
necessary and appropriate, "discharge certificated professional personnel."30 To assist the school board in governing the school district
and to implement the board's policies and decisions, the board is also
obligated "to employ a superintendent of schools... who shall be the
executive officer of the board of trustees with such powers and duties
31
as the board may prescribe."
Based on this structural relationship, a number of courts have
characterized the relationship between a superintendent as a "close
working relationship." 2 Thus, the relationship is one in which "[olne
of the superintendent's primary responsibilities is providing professional leadership to the Board,"3 3 and one where the "superintendent
and school board... [must have] a high level of confidence and
34
trust."
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has provided the most comprehensive judicial discussion of the relationship between the board of
trustees of a school district and its superintendent, stating as follows:
Another consideration is whether a close working relationship
is essential. [The superintendent] Kinsey occupied a high-level
policymaker position. Under [state] law, the Board is a corporate body with the exclusive power to manage and govern its
district's schools. It employs the superintendent, who "is the
educational leader and the administrative manager of the
school district." [CIonsideration should also be given to
whether the employee acts as an adviser or formulates plans
for the implementation of broad goals." One of Kinsey's pri29. IDAHO CODE § 33-501 (Michie 2001) ("Each school district shall be governed by a board of trustees.").
30. IDAHO CODE § 33-513(5) (Michie 2001).
31. IDAHO CODE § 33-513(2) (Michie 2001).
32. Kinsey v. Salado Indep. Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 988, 995-96 (5th Cir. 1992);
Patterson v. Ramsey, 413 F. Supp. 523, 542 (D. Md. 1976); see also Couper v. Madison
Bd.of Police and Fire Comm'rs, 369 F. Supp. 721, 727 (W.D. Wis. 1974).
33. Kilmer v. Dillingham City Sch. Dist., 932 P.2d 757, 766 (Alaska 1997); see
also Kinsey, 950 F.2d at 995-96.
34. Kilmer, 932 P.2d at 766 n.14; see also Kinsey, 950 F.2d at 996.
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mary duties was to advise the Board. He met with it in executive session and offered opinions and recommendations to
guide its decisions. Kinsey also handled the School District's
finances, and made recommendations to the Board on hiring
teachers and principals. And, because the Board can act only
by majority vote at duly called meetings, it was dependent
upon Kinsey, its chief administrator, to implement its policies
and decisions.
Therefore, he possessed the power to "make or break" Board
policies which "arguably afforded him the opportunity to
thwart or to forward [its] goals." In addition to occupying a
sensitive, high-level policymaking position in relation to the
Board, Kinsey occupied a confidential relationship. During executive sessions, he could be called on to advise the Board on
matters relating to real property transactions, personnel
grievances and hearings, student discipline cases, and other
confidential matters. Moreover, he was custodian of the
Board's confidential records. These could include personnel
and litigation files, sealed bids, drafts and working papers in
the preparation of proposed rules and policies, student records
and other confidential documents.
35
In sum, a close working relationship was essential.

Also, closer to home, the Executive Board of the Idaho School
Boards Association (ISBA) recently articulated a number of trustee
standards that expressly call for shared vision and unity between a
school board and its superintendent. 36 Those trustee standards state,
in pertinent part, as follows:
Vision
The board/superintendentteam creates a shared vision with a
focus on improving learningand achievement for all students.
Kinsey, 950 F.2d at 995-96 (citations omitted).
Trustee Standards promulgated by the Idaho School Boards Association,
at
available
Indicators
and
Standards
Board
School
Idaho
http://www.idsba.org/standards/index.html (2004).
35.
36.
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Teamwork
The board and superintendent work as a unified team to lead
the district toward the vision.

Structure
The board/ superintendent team provides a structure that supports the vision through aligned policy, goals, and financial
resources.

Accountability
The board/superintendentteam adopts and implement[s] an
accountability plan to evaluate progress towards the vision
and reports the results to the public.
Indicators:

The Team conducts regular and timely evaluations of the superintendent based on the vision, goals and performance of
the district and ensures that the superintendent holds district
personnel accountable. 37
In addition to the close working relationship that most school
boards have with a superintendent, courts have noted that most
school board members do not have any particular expertise in education or personnel matters, stating as follows:
The board of directors of any school district in our state is
elected and for the most part are laymen as to the field of education; and it is these laymen who govern our schools. Ordinarily, the initial hearing on discharge is held before the
board of directors. Its decision does not require the administrative expertise demanded in such regulatory areas as utility,
37.

Id.
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38
banking, tax, ecology, or professional fields.

At least one commentator on public school reform has decried the
malleability of school board members brought on by the over-reliance
upon and deference to superintendents and other administrators and
the board members' lack of expertise in the matters that come before
them. According to him,
[mlost school board members are well-intentioned individuals
who lack the political or educational savvy, sophistication and
expertise to tackle and exert influence on powerful superintendents, administrators, teacher unions, and vocal minorities. In far too many cases, boards are overwhelmed by the
educational establishment, showered with a massive blizzard
of education papers and studies, and intimidated to accept
staff recommendations with little discussion and understanding. Most Board members are brainwashed and expected to
avoid controversy and present a unified public position. All too
often, they are manipulated and relegated to being rubber
39
stamps for staff decisions.
Moreover, a school board's propensity to defer to the superintendent and rubber stamp his or her recommendations, notwithstanding
the differences in their roles in a teacher due process hearing, is more
than theoretical musing. Thus, where an Idaho school principal
sought an injunction to prevent the school board from sitting as decision makers in her discharge hearing based on her belief that one or
more of the board members would unfairly decide the issues in her
case, one of the school board members testified as follows:
Q.

Do you have a lot of respect for [the superintendent]?

A. A lot of respect, yes.... When I viewed him, I viewed
him as not only a Doctor of Education, but literally as a physician of education. He could do a lot of good for our School District.

38. Lines v. Yakima Sch. Dist. No. 7, 533 P.2d 140, 144 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975).
39. Chuck Sambar, School Reform: Who is Responsible? (Part 1 of 2) (personal
commentary), at http'//www.sambarpress.com/chucklschool-reform.htm (1999).
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Q. And given your respect for [the superintendent] and
given his recommendation, wouldn't it be extremely difficult
for you to go against his recommendation of discharge?
A. No. You have to realize [the superintendent] is extremely
professional. [The superintendent] knows his place. The Board
of Trustees are the only ones authorized to make that kind of
decision; he is not, and he knows that. All he is entitled to do
is make a recommendation ....
[Tihe lines of authority are
very clear; he knows where he stands, and we know where we
stand. His thing, again, is a recommendation. To go against
him -- it's not his decision to make; it's our decision to make.
Q. Okay. But given your respect for him and your characterization of him as not only as a doctor but a physician, would
you not accord some deference to his recommendation?
A. Speaking for me personally, it's not -- I don't -- it's not his
decision to make; it's mine. I wouldn't vote strictly to make
him happy, no.
Q. Okay. That really wasn't my question, though. My question was: Given your relationship with him and your feelings
about him, would you be inclined to accord any deference to
his recommendation?
A.

I'm not sure I understand your question.

Q. Well, you can start with a level playing field; and then
under some scenarios, because of the nature of the recommendation or the recommendationer, there can be a slight deference, sort of an imbalance in the playing field because of the
source of the recommendation. That is what I'm talking about
when I say, "deference." Wouldn't it, under the circumstances,
be the case that given your feelings about [the superintendent]'s qualifications that you would accord some deference to
his recommendation?
A. I'm still not sure what you are asking. I am not sure of
your questioning....
Q. Well, do you -- basically, given what you know of [the superintendent] and your respect for him, would you pay his
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recommendation more deference than if the recommendation
came from a non-educator?
A. I believe that [the superintendent] is highly qualified to
make this kind of recommendation or he wouldn't have made
it unless it needed to be made.
Q. Okay. And given your feelings about that, do you accord
that any more weight than you would to some other individual?
A.

Yes.40

And, in an action brought by a renewable-contract teacher alleging, among other things, that a school board did not have just and
reasonable cause to discharge him, a board member who participated
in the school board's deliberations on its superintendent's recommendation of nonrenewal, testified as follows:
Q.

The three gentlemen that voted in favor of the admini-

stration's recommendation ...

did you develop an impression

as to why they voted the way they did?
A.

Yes.

Q.

What was the impression?

A. They followed the administration's recommendation;
quote, "That's why we pay them."

40. Miller v. Bd. of Trs., Ririe Joint Sch. Dist. No. 252, No. CV-96-451, (Idaho
7th Dist. Ct., Jefferson County), Hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction conducted on February 6, 1997, at pp. 182-85. The Idaho Supreme Court allows a
teacher or principal to request a court to enjoin a school board or school board member
from participating in a due process hearing upon a showing that there is a probability
that the decision-maker will unfairly decide any issue presented at the hearing. Johnson v. Bonner County Sch. Dist. No. 82, 126 Idaho 490, 490-91, 887 P.2d 35, 35-36
(1994). Courts in other jurisdictions allow such challenge to be brought after the hearing has transpired. See, e.g., Staton v. Mayes, 552 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1977).

.
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did
As you were sitting there during the deliberations,
Q ....
the
following
board's
the
is,
that
you view what you saw there;
"that's what we pay
administration's recommendation because
of a referendum on
something
as
them for," did you view this
their approval of the administration?
but building adminA. Yes. Not just district administration,
what you define as
on
depends
it
-istrators, yes. So it means
both.
administration, but I would say yes to
on both [the buildQ. To both. It was kind of a referendum
building -ing principal's] administration of the
A.

Yes.

...
Q. -- and on then interim ...superintendent['s]
stration of the school district?
A.

admini-

Yes.

that the board felt that if
Q. Did you develop the impression
that would be kind of
it went against the recommendation,
vote of, "We don't think
casting a vote of no approval or a
you're doing a good job" to the administration?
A.

Certainly.

Q.

that?
Did you express your opinion about

at that point I had
A. I don't believe in those deliberations
the guts to.
time, even if you
Q. . . . Did you have an opinion at that
didn't express it?
A.

If I did, it was in its infancy.

Q.

state?
What was it, sort of, in its embryonic

as I recollect, I withheld
A. That they were yes-men. As far
any statement to that effect.
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Q.
... If you felt that over time you developed the impression, starting with Mr. Liebe's case, that the board were yesmen, did you feel that their decision in Mr. Liebe's matter was
evidence of that?
A.

Yes.

Q.
... Is that yes-men for the recommendations of the administration?
A.

Yes.41

To be sure, some board members are able to maintain independence from a superintendent in a discharge or nonrenewal proceeding.
Likewise, irrespective of whether a school board has exercised the
necessary independence from its superintendent to provide a teacher
with a fair hearing, a school board may well be justified in discharging
or not renewing the contract of the teacher for reasons amounting to
just cause or just and reasonable cause. The fact remains, however,
that a number of teachers discharged for alleged misconduct or ethics
violations have been awarded unemployment compensation because
the school district, as an employer, was not able to meet its burden of
demonstrating to the Department of Labor or Industrial Commission
that the teacher engaged in misconduct. 42 Similarly, in at least four
cases where an Idaho school board has discharged a teacher based on
alleged Code of Ethics violations, Idaho's Professional Standards Commission-the statewide agency vested with the responsibility of enforcing the Code of Ethics-has either declined to pursue or impose
any sanctions against the teachers' professional certificates, 43 or is41. Liebe v. Idaho Falls Sch. Dist. No. 91, No. CV-97-1101, (Idaho 7th Dist.
Ct., Bonneville County), deposition testimony of school board member taken on September 14, 1998, at pp. 37-40, 43.
42. See, e.g., Folks v. Moscow Sch. Dist. No. 281, 129 Idaho 833, 933 P.2d 642
(1997); Eligibility Determination-Unemployment Insurance Claim for Claimant Bonnie J. Belcourt, Idaho Dep't of Labor (Feb. 5, 2001); Decision of Appeals Examiner re:
Claimant Lane Anderson, Appeals Bureau, Idaho Dep't of Labor (Mar. 10, 1999); Decision of Appeals Examiner re: Claimant Martha Browning, Appeals Bureau, Idaho
Dep't of Labor (Dec. 19, 1997).
43. Hanshew v. Browning, Idaho Professional Standards Commission, Case
No. 97-025, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Preliminary Order of the Hear-
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sued the lesser sanction of a letter of reprimand or letter of concern."
And, in those same four cases, each of which went to litigation, one
case was settled based on a substantial monetary payment and offer
of reinstatement to the teacher from the school district. 45 Another was
settled based on the school board's withdrawing its decision dismissing the teacher and reinstating the teacher "[biased upon the findings
and conclusions of other tribunals." 46 Yet another was dismissed early
on by the plaintiff,47 and the other case remains pending. 48
Thus, in a substantial number of cases where school boards have
discharged teachers under a just and reasonable cause standard,
other Idaho administrative bodies have refused to impose serious
sanctions on the teacher or have refused to take adverse action at all.
These results occurred, notwithstanding that the evidence concerning
the teacher's alleged misconduct or code of ethics violation was essentially identical to the evidence presented by the school district administration to the school board.
B. Lack of Subpoena Power
It has frequently been said and recently reiterated that parties
appearing before courts and other adjudicative bodies are entitled to
"every man's evidence." 49 Unless a witness is willing to appear voluntarily, the witnesses' attendance and testimony at such proceedings
may be compelled via a subpoena issued under the authority of the
adjudicative body. In Idaho, subpoenas not only emanate from

ing Panel (June 16, 1998); Letter from Dr. Michael P. Stefanic, Administrator, Professional Standards Commission, to Nikkie J. Miller (Jan. 27, 1998).
44. Stefanic v. Belcourt, Idaho Professional Standards Commission, Case No.
2000-01, Stipulated Agreement, (Apr. 26, 2002); Letter from Dr. Michael P. Stefanic,
Administrator, Professional Standards Commission, to Ms. Lane M. Anderson (Jan. 27,
1999).
45. Release and Indemnity Agreement (Apr. 25, 2002) (settling Anderson v.
Bd. of Trs., Richfield Sch. Dist. No. 316, Case Nos. CV99-00168 and CV98-00165, (5th
Dist. Ct., Lincoln County)).
46. Confidential Settlement, Release and Indemnity Agreement and attached
Joint Statement (June 2001) (settling Browning v. Jefferson Joint Sch. Dist. No. 251,
Civ. No. 99-194-E-BLW (D. Idaho Apr. 11, 2001) (order denying certification)). The parties agreed that the other terms of the Browning settlement would remain confidential. Id.
47. Miller v. Ririe Joint Sch. Dist. No. 252, District of Idaho, Case No. Civ. 980379-E-BLW, Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice (filed Aug. 14, 2000), and Order
of Dismissal with Prejudice (Aug. 18, 2000).
48. Belcourt v. Wallace Sch. Dist. No. 393, District of Idaho, Case No. Civ. 02227-N-EJL.
49. United States ex rel. Watson v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 2003 WL
203568, *4 & n.7 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (quoting United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 9-10
(1973)).
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courts, 50 but also from arbitrators5' and state administrative agen2

cies.5
As mentioned earlier, section 33-513(5), the statutory provision
governing teacher discharge or nonrenewal proceedings, does not provide for the issuance of subpoenas to compel testimony or production
of documents relevant to the factual issues raised in such cases. Accordingly, as more fully discussed below, the lack of compulsory process may prevent a teacher from presenting evidence relevant to the
just and reasonable cause issue.
V. DUE PROCESS PRINCIPLES APPLIED
As discussed previously, the United States Supreme Court and
the Idaho Supreme Court have applied the following three factors in
determining whether a particular procedural safeguard is required by
due process:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.53
Turning to the first factor, the Idaho Supreme Court has tersely,
but accurately, stated, "the interest of a teacher with renewable contract rights is substantial." 4 Obviously, the loss of present and future
income associated with employment as a teacher cannot be gainsaid.
50. See ID. R. Civ. P. 45(a)-(f); FED. R. Civ. P. 45.
51. See IDAHO CODE § 7-907 (Michie 2004).
52. See IDAPA 04.11.01.525 (2004).
53. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); Bowler v. Bd. of Trs. of
Sch. Dist. No. 392, 101 Idaho 537, 542, 617 P.2d 841, 846 (1980). The author is not
aware of any courts that have applied the Mathews balancing test in determining
whether de novo review is constitutionally required when a court reviews a school
board's determination in a teacher discharge or nonrenewal case. However, a number
of courts have applied the Mathews factors in determining whether due process requires de novo judicial review of other quasi-judicial administrative or judicial decisions. See, e.g., Chmielewski v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 591 A.2d 101, 110-11 (Conn.
1991); In re Tyqwane V, 857 A.2d 963, 969-72 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004); United States v.
Hardage, 663 F. Supp. 1280, 1290 (W.D. Okla. 1987).
54. Bowler, 101 Idaho at 543, 617 P.2d at 847.
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The Idaho Supreme Court has also recognized that a public employee
faced with discharge or nonrenewal has "an interest in avoiding a loss
of reputation which may result in cases in which an employee is discharged for unjustifiable reasons." 55 And, beyond the employee's economic and reputational interests, most teachers have a psychological
interest in continuing to perform their duties of serving and educating
students--duties that have been referred to by some as "the noblest
profession." 56 Thus, perhaps other than a teacher's family or faith, his
or her continued employment as a teacher is of paramount importance. As such, the teacher's private interest in avoiding termination
or curing a wrongful termination strongly militates in favor of de novo
judicial review of a school board's just cause or just and reasonable
57
cause determination.
Second, the relational and procedural hallmarks of Idaho's administrative system governing teacher discharge and nonrenewal create a significant, intolerable risk of an erroneous deprivation of a
teacher's property interest in continued employment. This risk is created several ways: 1) the superintendent acts as a teammate of and
advisor to the school board; 2) the superintendent acts as the prosecutor or chief prosecution witness; 3) the board acts as jury and judge;
and, 4) neither party has subpoena power in the administrative proceeding. No judicial system would countenance a trial court proceeding whereby the prosecutor or chief prosecution witness also serves as
an advisor to or is an employee of the judge or jury. Likewise, no judicial system, except perhaps in the small claims setting, would allow
the adjudication of substantial rights without compulsory process. Yet
this very system is allowed in the administrative hearing process for
Idaho teachers faced with nonrenewal or discharge.
Based on the due process decisions of the United States and
Idaho Supreme Courts and the nature of school board decision making
in nonrenewal and discharge cases, an "unlevel playing field" exists
such that the system would not pass constitutional muster if a teacher

55.

Allen v. Lewis-Clark State Coll., 105 Idaho 447, 462, 670 P.2d 854, 869

(1983).
56. See, e.g., ROBERT A. SULLO, THE INSPIRING TEAcHER: NEW BEGINNINGS
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (1999).

57.

The Washington Court of Appeals has written that

[tihe impact of this decision, particularly where discharge occurs as opposed
to nonrenewal for financial reasons, may seriously impair a teacher's possibility in gaining new employment in his profession. Under the continuing contract law a teaching position is of such value as to bring into play enough 'due
process' notions as to entitle him to a full 'de novo' hearing.
Lines v. Yakima Pub. Sch., Yakima Sch. Dist. No. 7, 533 P.2d 140, 143 (Wash. Ct. App.
1975) (footnotes omitted).
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did not have the right to seek judicial review of a school board's just
cause determination. 5 Under circumstances where a school board's
decision to deprive a teacher of a constitutional property interest is
suspect either because of the relationship between the board and superintendent or because of the inability of the teacher to compel witnesses to testify, it would be grossly unfair for a court to defer to a
school board's just cause or just and reasonable cause determination
by applying a deferential arbitrary and capricious/substantial evidence/abuse standard of review, rather than applying an independent
de novo review standard. 59 Stated another way, it would be grossly unfair-indeed, constitutionally deficient-for a court to defer to the factual determinations of an administrative body where the proceedings
before the administrative body itself are constitutionally wanting. As
such, de novo judicial review is essential to ensuring that a school
board's just cause determination is based on the law and the evidence
and not, as the Supreme Court feared in Morgan, on "extraneous considerations."6 0 For these reasons, de novo review is essential in mini-

58. See Kelly v. Bd. of Educ. of Monticello Indep. Sch. Dist., 566 S.W.2d 165,
168 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (where "the prospect of a fair trial at the Board level is an 'illusion'.., a trial de novo... [would] cure any due process defects in the hearing before
the Board"); see also Casada v. Booneville Sch. Dist. No. 65, 686 F. Supp. 730, 731-33
(W.D. Ark. 1988) (teacher denied procedural due process where school district failed to
provide teacher with fair pretermination hearing and trial court review was not under
de novo standard); but cf Bd. of Fairfield Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Justmann, 476 N.W.2d
335, 340 (Iowa 1991) (no due process violation where superintendent served as prosecutor before school board in teacher discharge case).
59. The ability to compel witnesses-particularly, a teacher's colleagues-to
testify at a due process hearing may be crucial to the teacher's defense. The teacher's
colleagues, however, may be reluctant or unwilling to testify due to indifference or,
worse, due to perceived or real fear of retaliation from the school district administration. For these reasons, a number of courts in other settings have held that, where an
administrative body lacks subpoena power and, as a result, a party to an administrative proceeding is not able to compel the presence of witnesses or documents, judicial
review of such proceedings should be via a de novo evidentiary hearing. See, e.g., Dawson v. Richmond Heights Local Sch. Bd., 700 N.E.2d 359, 362-63 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997)
(review of school board decision suspending student); Scolaro v. D.C. Bd. of Elections
and Ethics, 691 A.2d 77, 90 (D.C. 1997) (judicial review of election challenge); Higgins
v. Kelley, 574 F.2d 789, 793-94 (3rd Cir. 1978) (judicial review of former FBI employee's claim for back pay and reinstatement).
60. Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 480 (1936). As the State of Washington Supreme Court cogently observed in a case upholding the constitutionality of de
novo review of school board discharge decisions as against a separation of powers challenge:
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mizing or avoiding the risk of erroneous discharge or nonrenewal decisions.
Third, the school district's "interest.. . is that of maintaining the
efficiency and discipline among its employees." 61 Certainly, the school
district has an interest in discharging or not renewing the contracts of
teachers whom it believes, because of misconduct or performance deficiencies, should not be in the classroom. Moreover, a more deferential
standard of review would, at least as to the factual issues underlying
school board just and reasonable cause determinations, make it less
likely that teachers would challenge school board decisions and, as a
result, would likely lead to less litigation and less expense for school
districts (and their insurance carriers).6 2 However, affording a teacher
the right to de novo judicial review neither hinders nor makes more
costly a school board's ability to make the initial, administrative decision to discharge a teacher. Furthermore, because school board discharge decisions are not subject to review under IDAPA but, instead,
are treated as breach of contract/statutory violation cases, the creation of a new evidentiary record via trial in the district court, absent
pretrial settlements, will inevitably occur. Also, even if a more deferential standard applied to a school board's just and reasonable cause
determination, a trial would still be necessary, if only to allow a jury
to act, not as the ultimate fact finder, but rather, to determine the
reasonableness of the school board's discharge or nonrenewal decision. 63 As such, use of a de novo standard of review will not cause any

When a teacher receives notice of probable cause, he has only 10 days to prepare for the hearing and his chance to fully develop the record for later review is somewhat limited. The de novo review by the superior court acts as a
safeguard against oppressive, hurried and often prejudged determinations
made by school boards. Members of the board cannot devote their entire time
to perfecting their knowledge of law--which is so necessary for the proper
safeguarding of important rights. The integrity of administrative and legislative independence is not threatened by de novo review, but, in fact, de novo
review in cases such as this assists in sharpening the lines separating each of
the coequal branches of government.
Francisco v. Bd. of Dirs. of Bellevue Pub. Sch., Dist. No. 405, 537 P.2d 789, 794 (Wash.
1975) (en banc) (emphasis added).
61. Allen v. Lewis-Clark State Coll., 105 Idaho 447, 462, 670 P.2d 854, 869
(1983); see also Bowler v. Bd. of Trs. of Sch. Dist. No. 392, Shoshone County, Mullan,
101 Idaho 537, 543, 617 P.2d 841, 847 (1980).
62. See Gwathmey v. Atkinson, 447 F. Supp. 1113, 1121 (E.D. Va. 1976), affd
mem., 556 F.2d 572 (4th Cir. 1977). Legal issues, however, would remain subject to de
novo review. See, e.g., Gauer v. Kadoka Sch. Dist. No. 35-1, 647 N.W.2d 727, 730 (S.D.
2002).
63. Towson Univ. v. Conte, 862 A.2d 941, 949-55 (Md. 2004); but cf Gwathmey, 447 F.Supp. at 1117 (summary judgment appropriate in teacher discharge case
where deferential, rather than de novo, standard of review applied).
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additional costs in the district court. Lastly, the school district's interest encompasses the public's interest." Although the school district
has an interest in efficiency and discipline, the school district's interest also encompasses the public's interest in providing an administrative and judicial review system in teacher discharge or nonrenewal
cases that ensures accurate and fair decision making, not only for the
affected teacher, but also for the school district's patrons and students. 65 Ultimately, the school district's interest, when viewed as a
whole, weighs against de novo review, but not nearly as severe as
surmised at first blush.
In sum, given Idaho's current administrative system for adjudicating teacher discharge and nonrenewal cases, upon challenge by the
affected teacher, due process requires that a court review a school
board's just and reasonable cause determination under a de novo
66
standard.
VI. CONSTITUTIONALLY ACCEPTABLE ADMINISTRATIVE
HEARING AND JUDICIAL REVIEW SYSTEMS
The key to affording procedural due process in teacher discharge
and nonrenewal cases is to set up at some stage an administrative and
judicial review system that provides the teacher with a level playing

64. Allen, 105 Idaho at 462, 670 P.2d at 869 (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416
U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)).
65. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 15 (1938);
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTIrUIoNAL LAW § 10-7, at 666-67 (2nd ed. 1988)
(cited and discussed in John E. Rumel, The Hourglass and Due Process: The Propriety
of Time Limits on Civil Trials, 26 U.S.F. L. REv. 237, 250-52 & nn.107-22 (1992)).
66. The author is aware of several cases that suggest or hold that de novo judicial review of a school board's decision discharging or not renewing the contract of a
teacher is not required by the due process clause. See, e.g., Barndt v. Wissahickon Sch.
Dist., 475 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Pa. 1979), affd mem., 615 F.2d 1352 (3rd Cir. 1980);
Gwathmey, 447 F. Supp. at 1117-19. In Barndt, however, the teacher admitted in her
brief on summary judgment that de novo review was not constitutionally mandated,
thereby eviscerating her argument that the "absence of [die novo judicial appeal deprive[d her] of any effective means to a hearing before an impartial tribunal." 475 F.
Supp. at 506 (emphasis added). Likewise, in Gwathmey and Barndt, the district courts
failed to address the practical temptation for well-meaning school board members to
rubber stamp the recommendation of their superintendent because of the superintendent's perceived expertise in personnel matters and to further school boardsuperintendent relations. For these reasons, the Barndt and Gwathmey decisions are
less than persuasive.
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field. As discussed above, Idaho's present administrative system for
teacher termination cases is only constitutionally acceptable under
due process principles if accompanied by de novo judicial review.
Alternative administrative hearing processes exist which would
obviate due process concerns. Such an alternative process in the present setting would require that the decision maker truly be an independent professional, have no relationship with the school district
administration, possess expertise in public sector or, specifically,
school district employment issues, and have the power to issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of
documents. Only if such safeguards are in place could the alternative
process then allow for review under a more deferential IDAPA arbitrary and capricious/substantial evidence/abuse of discretion standard. Although the details of any such alternative system are beyond
the scope of this article, two well-recognized administrative and judicial review systems exist and have been used to good effect in a number of jurisdictions. First, Idaho statutory law itself recognizes binding
arbitration, primarily in the non-employment context, followed by limited judicial review.6 7 Furthermore, the Idaho Supreme Court has affirmed the right of local education associations and school boards to
agree to binding arbitration in teacher nonrenewal matters. 68 Second,
several jurisdictions have created Public Employee Relation Boards
(followed, again, by limited judicial review) to address personnel matters and labor disputes, thereby professionalizing the employee and
labor relations process. 69 Although those public boards are typically
charged with resolving unfair labor practice claims brought by public
employees, their expertise in labor and employment matters would
readily translate to teacher nonrenewal and discharge proceedings.
VII. CONCLUSION
Idaho teachers possess significant, constitutionally-protected
property interests in their employment with local school districts. Yet,

67. Idaho's Uniform Arbitration Act validates written agreements to arbitrate, although the act does not currently apply to arbitration agreements between
employers and employees (unless otherwise provided in the agreement). IDAHO CODE
§ 7-901 (Michie 2001). As mentioned above, section 7-901 of the act further provides for
subpoena power, and section 7-912 provides extremely limited judicial review. Cady v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 113 Idaho 667, 747 P.2d 76 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987).
68. Bear Lake Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Trs. of Bear Lake Sch. Dist. No. 33, 116
Idaho 443, 776 P.2d 452 (1989).
69. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4321 (2001); CAL. GOVT. CODE § 3541.3
(West 1995); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.201 (West 2001).
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Idaho's statutory administrative system for teacher discharge and
nonrenewal proceedings (where the superintendent acts as the prosecutor or chief prosecution witness, the school board acts as judge and
jury, and compulsory process is unavailable) does not provide a level
playing field upon which teachers can protect and defend their constitutional property. Without taking into account these relational and
procedural defects, Idaho case law makes clear that judicial review of
school board just cause or just and reasonable cause determination in
teacher discharge and nonrenewal cases must be under a de novo
standard. Even if it did not, well-settled principles of procedural due
process lead to the same conclusion. In sum, unless the Idaho Legislature adopts an alternative statutory scheme that professionalizes the
administrative process (an unlikely occurrence, at best, given the legislature's time-honored preference for local school board control over
school district personnel matters), Idaho trial courts must review de
novo the just and reasonable cause determinations of local school
boards.

